THE BURGER COURT AND UNSPECIFIED RIGHTS:
ON PROTECTING FUNDAMENTAL AND NOT-SOFUNDAMENTAL "RIGHTS" OR
"INTERESTS" THROUGH A
FLEXIBLE CONCEPTION OF
EQUAL PROTECTION
TINSLEY

E. YARBROUGH*

In the field of substantive "rights" or "interests" not specifically
addressed by the Constitution's text, the Burger Court has mounted its
collective steed-with individual Justices facing opposite ends-and ridden
off forcefully in several directions at once. The Court now purports to limit
the fundamental rights branch of modern equal protection doctrine to those
cases involving restrictions on rights "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by
the Constitution." ' Only in those cases and in cases involving suspect
categories of classification is the strict, compelling-interest/least-restrictivealternative-means standard of scrutiny to be employed; all others require
application of the more lenient rational basis equal protection formula. In
practice, however, the Justices have frequently invoked rationality
rhetoric-or obscured the standard of scrutiny being applied-and then
subjected challenged regulations to more rigorous examination than the
rational basis test would dictate.
In a related series of cases, the Court has brought out of the closet its
formerly furtive relationship with substantive due process, and even buttressed that doctrine with a compelling interest formula borrowed from first
amendment and equal protection cases. 2 It has been reluctant, however, to
enlarge upon the list of "fundamental" rights included within the "liberty"
which the due process clauses guarantee? Finally, the Court has narrowed
the reach of its selective due process attacks, made under the due process
banner, on irrebuttable presumptions lacking in universal (or substantially
4
universal) validity.
* Professor of Political Science, East Carolina University. B.A. 1963, M.A. 1965,
Ph.D. 1967, University of Alabama.
I. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973).
2. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (mother's right to an abortion
held to be protected "liberty" guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment due process clause).
3. See, e.g., Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693
(1976).
4. See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
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The basic thesis of this Article may be briefly summarized: while the
Burger Court clearly is committed to the constitutional recognition of
interests not specifically mentioned in the document, its efforts toward that
end have drawn it into a doctrinal quagmire. As a desirable alternative to its
present approaches, it should re-bury substantive due process, dismantle the
rigid, two-tiered equal protection formula which it professes to embrace but
selectively ignores in practice, and adopt a flexible equal protection standard
as the sole tool for affording unspecified rights or interests varying degrees
of constitutional protection. This Article first surveys the recent developments alluded to above. The second section analyzes the flexible conception
of equal protection now being advanced by Justice Marshall on the Court,
while the third elaborates and defends the Article's thesis.
THE BURGER COURT AND UNSPECIFIED RIGHTS: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. Equal Protection
I.

Dissenting in Shapiro v. Thompson, 5 Justice Harlan developed an
elaborate critique of modern equal protection doctrine. While rejecting as
"unwise" the Warren Court's extension beyond race of the suspect
categories branch of the "new" equal protection doctrine, 6 Justice Harlan
devoted primary attention to what he viewed as the "even more trouble7
some" fundamental rights branch:
I think this branch of the "compelling interest" doctrine particularly unfortunate and unnecessary. It is unfortunate because it creates
an exception which threatens to swallow the standard [rational basis]
equal protection rule. Virtually every statute affects important rights
[not necessarily given specific mention in the Constitution] ....
Rights such as these are in principle indistinguishable from those involved here, and to extend the "compelling interest" rule to all cases in
which such rights are affected would go far toward making this Court a
"super-legislature." This branch of the doctrine is also unnecessary.
When the right affected is one assured by the Federal Constitution, any
infringement can be dealt with under the Due Process Clause. But when
a statute affects only matters not mentioned in the Federal Constitution
and is not arbitrary or irrational, I must reiterate that I know of nothing
which entitles this Court to pick out particular human activities, characterize them as "fundamental," and give them added protection under
an unusually stringent equal protection testY
5. 394 U.S. 618, 655 (1969).
6. Id. at 655, 659.
7. Id. at 660.
8. Id. at 661-62. Justice Black, Justice Harlan's principal jurisprudential antagonist on
the Court, also expressed concern about the "super-legislature" implications of the "new"
equal protection. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 675-80 (1966)
(Black, J., dissenting).
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Justice Stewart filed a brief concurrence challenging Justice Harlan's reading of the Shapiro Court's approach. The majority, he wrote, was not
arbitrarily labeling particular activities "fundamental rights" and then subjecting their regulation to strict scrutiny. Instead, it was reserving strict
scrutiny in the equal protection field for those laws having a discriminatory
impact on an "established constitutional right. "9
Whatever the accuracy of Justice Stewart's reading of Shapiro, the
Burger Court has endorsed his interpretation of the fundamental rights
doctrine in the equal protection field. Its most emphatic statement to date
came in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,10 the 1973
case affirming Texas' scheme for financing public schools largely through
local property taxes. Since the system at issue there resulted in budget
disparities among school districts, its challengers urged application of the
compelling interest standard, claiming suspect wealth discrimination and
infringements on the fundamental right to an equal education. The Court, in
an opinion written by Justice Powell, declined the invitation and instead
found the system rationally related to a state interest in local control of
education. In rejecting the claim that any law creating inequities in education is per se amenable to strict scrutiny, Justice Powell observed:
It is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional
rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. Thus,
the key to discovering whether education is "fundamental" is not to be
found in comparisons of the relative societal significance of education
as opposed to subsistence or housing. Nor is it to be found by weighing
whether education is as important as the right to travel. Rather, the
to education explicitly
answer lies in assessing whether there is a right
1
or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution."
In Justice Powell's view, failure to limit the fundamental rights branch of
equal protection analysis to established constitutional rights would convert
the Court, as Justice Harlan had warned, into a super-legislature.12
Even before Rodriguez, of course, the Court had rejected strict
scrutiny of welfare and related regulations. In Shapiro, Justice Brennan had
asserted for the majority that the one-year waiting requirement for welfare
benefits at issue there denied one class of needy residents the opportunity
"to obtain the very means to subsist-food, shelter, and other necessities of
life.- ' 13 Since, however, the effect of the waiting requirement on the established right of interstate travel was available as a triggering device in
9. 394 U.S. at 642.
10. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). For a recent reaffirmation of the Rodriguez approach, see
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
11. 411 U.S. at 33-34.
12. Id. at 31.
13. 394 U.S. at 627.
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Shapiro, the "necessities of life" language was unnecessary for an application of strict scrutiny in the case. And the Burger Court has refused to
recognize a fundamental right to the necessities of life in equal protection
and due process contexts. In language foreshadowing Justice Powell's
pronouncements for the Rodriguez majority, for example, Justice White
concluded for the Court in a 1972 case: "We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe, and sanitary housing. But the Constitution does not
provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill. We are unable
to perceive in that document any constitutional guarantee of access to
dwellings of a particular quality . ...
-14 During the 1975 term,
moreover, the Court rejected "the proposition that a right of governmental
employment per se is fundamental" in an equal protection context.15
In such cases, the Court has held, the rational basis standard traditionally employed in economic cases is applicable. 16 As if to underscore the
extremely lenient nature of that standard, the Court recently overruled its
1957 decision in Morey v. Doud17 -the sole Supreme Court case in almost
half a century invalidating an economic regulation on equal protection
grounds. Morey had held invalid an Illinois statute exempting the American
Express Company from regulations relating to the sale of money orders. In
Dukes v. City of New Orleans,1 8 the Fifth Circuit had cited Morey as its
"chief guide" in overturning an ordinance banning from the New Orleans
French Quarter all pushcart vendors except those who had continually
operated the same business in the Quarter for the past eight years. A
unanimous Supreme Court summarily reversed, 19 upholding the ordinance
as rationally furthering the purpose of preserving the Quarter's appearance
14. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972); cf. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535,

546-47 (1972); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471, 485-86 (1970). For a critical analysis of the Court's reasoning and decisions in the
welfare areas, see Reinstein, The Welfare Cases: FundamentalRights, the Poor, and the
Burden of Proof in Constitutional Litigation, 44 TEMP. L.Q. 1 (1970). For an admiring
pre-Rodriguez discussion of Burger Court strictures on the scope of equal protection, see
Mendelson, From Warren to Burger: The Rise and Decline of Substantive Equal Protection,
66 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1226 (1972). Winter, The Changing Parametersof Substantive Equal
Protection:From the Warren to the Burger Era, 23 EMORY L.J. 657 (1974), contains a useful
survey of equal protection cases decided from Chief Justice Burger's appointment to the
end of the 1972-73 term.
Post-Rodriguez welfare cases blurring somewhat the equal protection standard being
applied include Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 633-34 (1974), and Department of
Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533-38 (1973). See generally Coven & Fersh, Equal
Protection,Social Welfare Litigation, and the Burger Court,51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 873 (1976).
15. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976).
16. The modem precedent most frequently cited is Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348
U.S. 483 (1955).
17. 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
18. 501 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
19. Justice Stevens did not participate in the decision.
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and customs and emphasizing that "[w]hen local economic regulation is
challenged solely as violating the Equal Protection Clause, this Court
consistently defers to legislative determinations as to the desirability of
particular statutory discriminations." 2 Characterizing Morey as "a needlessly intrusive judicial infringement on the State's legislative powers," the
Court concluded that "the decision so far departs from proper equal protection analysis in cases of exclusively economic regulation that it should be,
and it is, overruled."'"
The Court's application of equal protection doctrine, of course, has not
been nearly so rigid as its opinions in Rodriguez and related cases would
seem to require. The Rodriguez majority narrowly limited the concept of
wealth as a suspect category and the application of the compelling interest

standard in wealth discrimination contexts. In dictum, it also defined suspect classes in general as those "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected
to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a
position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection
from the majoritarian political process. '"22 In other cases, the Court has
declined to include sex,2 3 age24 or illegitimacy25 among the suspect
20. 427 U.S. at 303.
21. Id. at 306.
22. 411 U.S. at 28.
23. Cf. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). But see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 688 (1973), in which a plurality of Justices included sex within the category of suspect
classifications. For illustrations of the varying treatment given sex-related classifications
since Frontiero, see Califano v. Goldfarb, 97 S. Ct. 1021 (1977) (provision of Social Security
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 402(f)(1)(D) (1970), requiring that a widower prove dependency upon his
deceased wife in order to collect survivor's benefits held to violate equal protection where
proof of dependency was not required for a widow to collect similar benefits); Stanton v.
Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (statute that distinguished on basis of sex the age at which child
reached majority held violative of equal protection clause); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420
U.S. 636 (1975) (Social Security Act's gender-based denial of survivor benefits to widower
held violative of equal protection clause); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975)
(statute that required mandatory retirement of male military officers at an earlier age than
female officers held rational and not violative of the equal protection clause); Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496, n.20 (1974) (denial of disability payments to pregnant women not
violative of equal protection clause); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (statute that
granted property tax exemption to widow but not widower not violative of equal protection
clause). In its most recent treatment of a sex-based classification in the context of a state
statute, the Court struck down an Oklahoma law which allowed women to purchase 3.2 beer
at eighteen years of age while forbidding men to purchase the beverage until they reached
twenty-one. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, held that the statute failed to satisfy
equal protection standards for classifications by gender which require that such classifications
"serve important governmental objectives and . .. be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives." Craig v. Boren, 97 S.Ct. 451, 457 (1976).
24. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (mandatory
retirement age for state police not violative of equal protection clause).
25. See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976) (provisions of Social Security Act
which require that only illegitimate children must prove, prior to recovery of survivor
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categories of classification. 26
While the Court has generally invoked the rhetoric of traditional equal
protection analysis in such cases, it recently characterized the standard to be
employed in cases involving classifications based on illegitimacy as one of
"less than strictest scrutiny," 27 adding that such a standard was "not a
toothless one." '28 More significantly, it has actually subjected the regulations at issue in these and related cases to stricter standards of scrutiny than
required by the rational basis formula. While accepting justifications for
such regulations which would normally be considered inadequate under
strict review standards, 29 the Court has insisted that challenged provisions
actually be related to asserted legislative goals and has even invalidated
certain statutes clearly designed to further a legitimate governmental purpose. In Reed v. Reed,3" the landmark among cases of this kind, the Court
declared unconstitutional a probate provision which granted men automatic
preference over women in the appointment of administrators for decedents'
estates. The regulation was defended as a device for reducing the workload
of probate courts. Chief Justice Burger agreed for the Court that such an
objective "[c]learly . . . is not without some legitimacy." He added,
however: "To give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over
members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on
the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden
by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ... ."I' In
cases involving "semi-suspect" classifications, and in certain other cases in
which application of strict scrutiny was sought, the Burger Court has plowed
a middle ground between the extremely stringent compelling interest standbenefits, that deceased wage earner was child's parent and that child was actually dependent
on wage earner do not violate equal protection clause).

26. Alienage remains among the suspect classifications. See, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413
U.S. 717 (1973) (exclusion of aliens from practice of law violates equal protection clause);
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372, 376 (1971) (denial of welfare benefits to aliens
violative of equal protection). However, federal regulations bearing unequally on aliens are
not infrequently upheld on the basis of Congress' power over immigration and naturalization.
See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976) (five-year residence requirement for
aliens before receiving Medicare not violative of fifth amendment). But see Hampton v.
Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100-05 (1976) (exclusion of aliens from federal civil service
jobs violates fifth amendment).

27. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976).
28. Id.
29. In Lucas, for example, the Court upheld a social security regulation limiting the

survivor rights of illegitimate children, a provision enacted "obviously to serve administrative
convenience." Id. at 509. Cf. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972) (statute
denying unwed fathers a fitness-for-custody hearing upon death of mother violative of equal
protection); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, (1969) (statutes denying welfare assistance
to residents of less than one year held to violate equal protection clause).
30. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
31. Id. at 76. Also see Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417
U.S. 628 (1974) (distinctions based on illegitimacy under the Social Security Act).
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ard and the total lack of scrutiny implicit in the rational basis test. In a
number of cases seemingly appropriate for a compelling interest mode of
somewhat imprecise but
analysis, on the other hand, the Court has imposed
32
scrutiny.
of
standards
stringent
less
apparently
B.

Substantive Due Process

In explaining the Warren Court's reliance on equal protection as its
principal tool for expanding the scope of substantive constitutional rights,
Wallace Mendelson logically assumed: "Return to nonprocedural due process was unthinkable; its unhappy history is still too vivid." ' 33 Ironically,
however, in the same term in which the Rodriguez majority purported to
articulate significant restrictions on the reach of Warren Court precedents in
the equal protection field, the Court also openly embraced and enhanced the
concept of substantive due process. Speaking for the majority in Roe v.
Wade ,34 Justice Blackmun chose to find the ambulatory right of privacyand within it a right to abort pregnancies-not in the "penumbras" of
specific Bill of Rights guarantees, 35 nor in the enigmas of the ninth amendment, 36 but "in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty." 37 Moreover, he ascribed to the doctrine a greater bite than that evident
in the rhetoric of earlier cases, including perhaps those decided during the
heyday of substantive due process in the economic field. Noting that only
"fundamental rights" were included within the privacy concept, 3 8 he concluded that "[w]here certain 'fundamental rights' are involved," application of the compelling interest test is required and laws touching such rights
32.

See, e.g., Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973) and Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S.

686 (voting and travel); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (privacy). See also Lubin v.
Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 718, (1974) and Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 142-44 (1972) (both

striking down financial barriers to candidate access to election ballots on the ground that the
restrictions were not "reasonably necessary" to the accomplishment of state interests in

electoral integrity).
The standard of analysis has been similarly blurred in a number of first amendment and
first amendment-cum-equal protection cases. See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817
(1974); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974); American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974);
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). For a brief analysis of this line of cases, see
Yarbrough, The Burger Court and Freedom of Expression, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 37,

81-82 (1976).
In a sympathetic discussion of early Burger Court decisions blurring the standards of
equal protection, Professor Gunther has advocated means-oriented scrutiny of challenged
legislation as an alternative to the "new" equal protection. See Gunther, The Supreme
Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV 1 (1972).
33. Mendelson, supra note 14, at 1232.
34. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
35. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
36. Id. at 486-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
37. 410 U.S. at 153.
38. Id. at 152.
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are to be narrowly drawn. 39 Justice Blackmun quoted approvingly 40 from
Justice Holmes' dissent in Lochner v. New York 4l attacking that Court's
use of substantive due process to rule on the wisdom of legislation and
admonishing the majority that "the accident of our finding certain opinions
natural and familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our
judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with
the Constitution of the United States. '"42 As Justice Rehnquist acidly observed in dissent, however, the result reached by the Roe majority was
"more closely attuned to the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Peckham in
43
[the Lochner] case."
Its expansive rhetoric to the contrary, Roe has not been the harbinger
of a broad and vigorous application of substantive due process by the Burger
Court. In one recent case, 44 in fact, the Court, speaking through Roe
dissenter Justice Rehnquist, appeared to read Roe as basing the right of
privacy on the penumbral concept, in the manner of Justice Douglas'
opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut,4 5 rather than on substantive due process. Citing Roe, Justice Rehnquist wrote: "While there is no 'right of
privacy' found in any specific guarantee of the Constitution, the Court has
recognized that 'zones of privacy' may be created by more specific constitutional guarantees and thereby impose limits upon governmental power.' '46
More significantly, the Court has been reluctant to expand the scope of
substantive rights covered by the due process guarantee and has appeared to
adopt a two-tiered (or, perhaps, multi-tiered) substantive due process formula in cases involving noneconomic activities which bears some resemblance
to its articulated approach in the equal protection field.
Paul v. Davis,4 decided during the 1975-76 term, gave the word
"liberty" in the due process clauses an unusually restrictive reading. Police
in the Louisville, Kentucky, area had circulated to about 800 merchants a
five-page flyer containing mugshots of "active shoplifters." For fifteen
years, area police had circulated similar notices for a variety of offenses,
and included in the flyers were numerous individuals who had never been
convicted of any crime and whose only "offense" was having been arrested
for shoplifting. Among those identified in the flyer as "known to be active
in [the shoplifting] field" was one Edward Charles Davis, III, whose photo
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 155.
Id. at 117.
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
Id. at 76.
410 U.S. at 174.
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
424 U.S. at 712-13.
424 U.S. 693 (1976).
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and name appeared on the second page. Davis had been arrested by a store's
security police more than seventeen months before distribution of the flyer.
Prior to the flyer's circulation, his case had been put into an inactive file;
shortly after its distribution, the case had been dismissed. Davis brought suit
for injunctive relief and damages in federal district court, claiming that
circulation of the flyer denied him due process in that the practice inhibited
him from entering business establishments and seriously impaired his future
employment opportunities. The district court dismissed, but the court of
appeals reversed the dismissal, citing Wisconsin v. Constantineau.48 The
Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Rehnquist, reversed the court of
appeals and upheld the challenged practice.
Constantineau had invalidated Wisconsin's "posting law," under
which liquor sales to persons designated excessive drinkers were prohibited
and notices to that effect were posted in retail liquor outlets. In striking
down the statute, Justice Douglas concluded for the Court: "Where a
person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of
what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard
are essential." 49 In Paul,5" Justice Rehnquist distinguished Constantineau
and related cases 51 and rejected "the proposition that reputation alone, apart
from some more tangible interests such as employment, is either 'liberty' or
'property' by itself sufficient to invoke the procedural protection of the Due
Process Clause." 52 The earlier cases, he wrote, had involved not only injury
to reputation but also governmental action altering an individual's legal
status:
[Ihe governmental action taken [in Constantineau]deprived the individual of a right previously held under state law-the right to purchase
or obtain liquor in common with the rest of the citizenry. "Posting,"
therefore, significantly altered his status as a matter of state law, and it
was that alternation of legal status which, combined with the injury
resulting from the defamation, justified the invocation of procedural
safeguards. The "stigma" resulting from the defamatory character of
the posting was doubtless an important factor in evaluating the extent
of harm worked by that act, but we do not think that such defamation,
standing alone, deprived Constantineau of any "liberty" protected by
53
the procedural guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.
48. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
49. Id.at 437.
50. 424 U.S. at 701-10.
51. E.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564
(1972); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); United States v.
Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
52. 424 U.S. at 701.
53. Id. at 708-09. The irony of Justice Rehnquist's reasoning is somewhat amusing. Mr.
Constantineau's "legal status" was affected by the "posting law"--and he was thus granted
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Justice Rehnquist also refused to include Davis' claim within the rubric of
the privacy concept.5 4
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall and in part by Justice
White, wrote a stinging dissent. Characterizing "the enjoyment of one's
good name and reputation" as "among the most cherished of rights,"55 he
exclaimed:
The Court today holds that police officials, acting in their official
capacities as law enforcers, may on their own initiative and without
trial constitutionally condemn innocent individuals as criminals and
thereby brand them with one of the most stigmatizing and debilitating
labels in our society. If there are no constitutional restraints on such
oppressive behavior, the safeguards constitutionally accorded an accused in a criminal trial are rendered a sham, and no individual can feel
secure that he will not be arbitrarily singled out for similar ex parte
punishment by those primarily charged with fair enforcement of the
law. The Court accomplishes this result by excluding a person's interest in his good name and reputation from all constitutional protection,
regardless of the character of or necessity for the government's actions. The result . . . is demonstrably inconsistent with our prior case
law and unduly restrictive in its construction of our precious Bill of
Rights .... 56
,
Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Paul v. Davis placed the case closest
perhaps to that line of decisions involving claims that notice and some sort
of hearing-i.e., procedural due process-are requred when liberty or
property interests-usually those defined by law-are affected by government. 57 The considerations underlying the Court's delineation of such interests in a procedural due process context may differ somewhat from its
approach in substantive due process cases. Even so, Paul is evidence of the
relief-purely because the sale and purchase of liquor are activities traditionally subject to
state control in the public interest. Since shopping and job-hunting, the activities affected by
circulation of the flyer at issue in Paul, are generally free of governmental control, Davis

was denied relief. The lesson of Paul, therefore, would appear to be that the Constitution
provides greater protection for the "right" to purchase liquor and engage in other activities
regulated by state criminal statute than for activities for which such controls are deemed
unnecessary.
54. Id. at 712-13.

55. Id. at 722-23.
56. Id. at 714.
57. See, e.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) (policeman dismissal); Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (termination of welfare benefits); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565

(1975) (high school student suspension); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (prison
discipline); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1972) (probation revocation); Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) and Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (faculty
dismissal); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parole revocation); Goldberg v. Kelly,

397 U.S. 254 (1970) (termination of welfare benefits). See also North Georgia Finishing, Inc.
v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975) (garnishment); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S.
600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (property repossession).
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Court's reluctance to employ due process as a device for expanding the
scope of constitutional rights not given specific mention in the Constitution. 58 Kelley v. Johnson, 9 another case decided during the 1975-76 term,
suggests that even when the Court includes additional noneconomic activities within the scope of liberty in the due process guarantee, it may afford
such activities only minimal constitutional protection.
After years of avoiding the issue,60 the Court in Kelley finally disposed
of a constitutional challenge to a hair-grooming regulation-albeit not in the
sort of student rights context in which such claims had been previously
raised. The Kelley Court, in yet another opinion by Justice Rehnquist,
upheld the validity of a New York county police department's regulations
banning beards, flared sideburns, and hair over the collar on uniformed
policemen and requiring their hair to be neat, clean, trimmed and well
groomed. Justice Rehnquist was willing to "assume" that "the citizenry at
large has some sort of 'liberty' interest within the Fourteenth Amendment in
matters of personal appearance." 61 He noted, however, that constitutional
distinctions could be drawn between the rights of government personnel and
those of the general citizenry and observed that even in the immediate past
the Court had upheld significant restrictions on the first amendment activities of government employees. Moreover, he added, "If such state
regulations may survive challenges based on the explicit language of the
First Amendment, there is surely even more room for restrictive regulations
of state employees where the claim implicates only the more general con58.

The Court's recent rulings in cases involving claims to notice and hearing in civil

proceedings also suggest development of a more restrictive stance. In Bishop v. Wood, 426
U.S. 341 (1976), the Court, in an opinion written by Justice Stevens, appeared to hold that
the procedures required when an individual is deprived of a legal entitlement may be

conditioned by the law creating the entitlement. See also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 339-49 (1976) (termination of disability benefits under Social Security Act); Arnett v.

Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 152-54 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., writing for plurality of three) (dismissal of
non-probationary federal civil service employee).

In the context of criminal proceedings, of course, a number of Burger Court decisions
have imposed due process standards held to be implicit in conceptions of "fundamental

fairness." See, e.g., Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 476 (1973) (reciprocal discovery
rights in a criminal trial compelled if state required notice of alibi defense); Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295, 302 (1973) (denial of right to cross-examine adverse witness
and to present reliable hearsay evidence in rebuttal violative of due process). With respect
to the rights of convicted persons, recent cases indicate an attitude more akin to the civil

holdings cited above. See Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976) (transfer of state
prisoner from one facility to another does not require hearing if incarceration is within the
imposed sentence); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976) (transfer of state prisoner to a
less attractive facility does not require a hearing absent some right or justifiable expectation
rooted in state law that he will not be transferred except for misbehavior).
59. 425 U.S. 238 (1976).
60. See, e.g., New Rider v. Board of Educ., 414 U.S. 1097 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari).
61. 425 U.S. at 244.
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tours of the substantive liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." 6z Regulations relating to the organizational structure of police agencies enjoy a strong presumption of validity; the Court's task is merely that of
determining whether the decision to enact such regulations "isso irrational
that it may be branded 'arbitrary,' and therefore a deprivation of respondent's 'liberty' interest in choosing his own hairstyle.' '63 The challenged
regulations were valid, he concluded, because they were rationally related to
the legitimate goals of encouraging police esprit de corps and making
policemen more readily recognizable to the public.
Three Justices went on record as clearly recognizing a liberty interest in
personal appearance under the due process guarantee, and would have given
that interest stronger protection than it was accorded in the majority opinion.
Justice Powell wrote a brief concurrence urging a weighing of competing
interests in such cases. 64 Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan,
registered a dissent. Excluding matters of personal appearance from the
fourteenth amendment's right to liberty, Justice Marshall contended,
"would be fundamentally inconsistent with the values of privacy, selfidentity, autonomy, and personal integrity that I have always assumed the
Constitution was designed to protect." 6 5 The right was implicit, he wrote, in
the right of each person to control his own person and to be left alone; its
infrequent mention in earlier cases or in the nation's history meant simply
that it was a right "so clear as to be beyond question. When the right has
been mentioned, its existence has simply been taken for granted.'"66 Justice
Marshall reserved the question whether strict scrutiny should be imposed in
the case because, he said, the challenged regulation "fails to pass even a
minimal degree of scrutiny."67 He chided the majority's acceptance of the
contention that the regulation would make uniformed policemen more readily identifiable to the public. Since the president of the local Patrolmen's
Benevolent Association had brought the challenge to the hair rule and the
International Brotherhood of Police Officers had filed an amicus brief,
Justice Marshall further contended that, if anything, the rule had served to
create morale problems rather than stimulate a sense of espirt de corps.
C.

IrrebuttablePresumptions

At times, the Burger Court has subjected legislative classifications to a
form of strict scrutiny through application of the doctrine that a statute
62. Id. at 245. The cases cited were Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S.
548 (1973) and Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
63. 425 U.S. at 248.
64. Id. at 249.
65. Id. at 251.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 256 n.8.
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violates due process if based on an irrebuttable presumption which lacks
universal, or near universal, validity. The doctrine, which has its roots in a
number of early economic cases 68 and in modern equal protection 69 and
procedural due process decisions, 70 arguably was first clearly articulated and
applied by the Burger Court in the 1972 case of Stanley v. Illinois.71 There
Justice White invoked the irrebuttable presumption formula and equal protection doctrine to strike down a statutory presumption that all unmarried
fathers were unqualified to raise their children. Under the statute, unmarried
fathers were denied custody of their children, without any hearing on
parental fitness and without proof of neglect, even though such proceedings
were required in custody cases involving married or divorced parents and
unmarried mothers. Several later cases have also invoked the doctrine.
Vlandis v. Kline 72 invalidated a Connecticut regulation which stipulated
that a student who entered a state college as an out-of-state resident would
retain that status throughout his career. Cleveland Board of Education v.
LaFleur73 struck down provisions requiring mandatory leave for pregnant
teachers five months and four months before an expected birth by rejecting
the irrebuttable presumption that such teachers were unfit for service after
the date stipulated. And in Departmentof Agriculture v. Murry, 74 the Court
invalidated on the ground of overbreadth a federal food stamp regulation
excluding from coverage any household containing a tax dependent of a
taxpayer who was not a member of an eligible household.
Justice Stewart, who supports a somewhat restrictive interpretation of
the equal protection guarantee, 75 authored the Court's opinions in Vlandis
and LaFleur. The doctrine of irrebuttable presumptions would appear to be
a useful tool for those Justices, such as Justice Stewart, who are interested in
applying strict scrutiny to certain legislative classifications without extending the reach of modern equal protection analysis. The doctrine has also had
its detractors, however, and Justice Rehnquist, to no one's surprise, has
68. See Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932); Hoeper v. Tax Comm'n, 284 U.S. 206
(1931); Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230 (1926).

69.
70.
71.
reflect

See Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
405 U.S. 645 (1972). While it was decided by a "Nixon era" Court, Stanley did not
the views of the Nixon appointees. The majority opinion, joined by Justices Brennan,

Stewart and Marshall, and in part by Justice Douglas, was written by Justice White; Chief

Justice Burger filed a dissent joined by Justice Blackmun, and Justices Powell and Rehnquist
took no part in the decision.
72. 412 U.S. 441 (1973). The majority opinion in Vlandis, written by Justice Stewart, was
concurred in by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Powell, with Justice White concurring in the judgment; Chief Justice Burger and Justices Douglas and Rehnquist dissented.
73. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
74. 413 U.S. 508 (1973).

75. See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 636-37 (1969) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
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been its harshest critic on the Court. 76 Justice Rehnquist, joined by the Chief

Justice, filed a pointed dissent in LaFleur. A major development in the
history of law, he observed, had been the establishment of general
prophylactic rules as an alternative to government by whim. The lines drawn
in such regulations were rarely, if ever, perfect. Thus, said Justice Rehnquist, Justice Stewart was leading the Court "in another quixotic engagement in his apparently unending war on irrebutable presumptions," 77 which
was "in the last analysis nothing less than an attack upon the very notion of
78
lawmaking itself."
As if to emphasize that there are limits to the doctrine's reach, the
Court yejected a number of irrebuttable presumption claims during the same
period in which Vlandis, LaFleur and Murry were decided. 79 In Weinberger v. Salfi, 80 moreover, a majority which included Justice Stewart
attempted to articulate the doctrine's limits. Salfi upheld a social security
regulation prohibiting a wage earner's widow and stepchildren from receiving insurance benefits unless their relationships to the wage earner existed at
least nine months prior to his death. The Court, speaking through Justice
Rehnquist, emphasized once again the deference to be given social security
and other welfare provisions challenged under equal protection and held that
the regulation at issue was rationally related to a government interest in
preventing sham marriages entered for the purpose of securing social security benefits.
76. For scholarly critiques of the doctrine, see Note, The IrrebuttablePresumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1534 (1974); Note, IrrebuttablePresumptions:An
Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 449 (1975).

77. 414 U.S. at 657.
78. Id. at 660. Justice Powell wrote a brief concurrence with the decision in LaFleur,
basing his vote on the equal protection clause and warning: "As a matter of logic, it is difficult
to see the terminus of the road upon which the Court has embarked under the banner of
'irrebuttable presumptions.' " Id. at 652.
Even supporters of the doctrine have recognized that certain limits must be imposed on its
reach. Dissenting in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975), Justice Brennan noted that he was
not contending, "nor has the Court ever held, that all statutory provisions based on assumptions about underlying facts are per se unconstitutional unless individual hearings are provided." Id. at 804 (emphasis in original).
79. Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 422-30 (1974) (holding that the Narcotics
Rehabilitation Act of 1966 did not deny due process or equal protection by excluding addicts
with two or more prior felony convictions from rehabilitative commitment as an alternative to
penal incarceration); Mourning v. Family Publications Service, 411 U.S. 356, 362-63, 376-77
(1973) (rejecting irrebuttable presumption attack on regulation promulated by Federal Reserve
Board pursuant to the Truth in Lending Act, which required certain disclosures by a 'ller who
extended credit payable in more than four installments).
80. 422 U.S. 749 (1975). See also Mathews v. DeCastro, 97 S. Ct. 431, 432-36 (1976)
(holding that § 202(b)(1) of the Social Security Act which grants benefits to a married woman
under 62 whose husband retires or becomes disabled if she has a minor or dependent child in her
care, but denies such benefits to a' divorced woman under 62 whose ex-husband retires or
becomes disabled even if she has aiyoung or dependent child, does not violate the due process
clause).
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Justice Rehnquist distinguished Stanley, Vlandis and LaFleur, on
which the lower court had relied in invalidating the regulation. He noted that
Stanley had involved the right to conceive and raise children, and LaFleur
the freedom of choice in marriage and family life. "[A] noncontractual
claim to receive funds from the public treasury," on the other hand, "enjoys
no constitutionally protected status."81 Vlandis could not be disposed of so
easily since the regulation at issue there had only affected access to an
education and Rodriguez had excluded education from the categories of
fundamental constitutional rights. In holding Vlandis inapplicable, Justice
Rehnquist observed:
Unlike the statutory scheme in Viandis ... , the Social Security Act
does not purport to speak in terms of the bona fides of the parties to a
marriage, but then make plainly relevant evidence of such bona fides
inadmissable. . . . [Tihe benefits here are available upon compliance
with an objective criterion, one which the Legislature considered to
bear a sufficiently close nexus with underlying policy objectives to be
used as the test for eligibility. . . . [A]ppellees are completely free to
present evidence that they meet the specified requirements.8 2
In short, the regulation at issue in Vlandis had been struck down because it
denied students who were in fact in-state residents an opportunity to establish that status.
Echoing the language of his LaFleur dissent, Justice Rehnquist noted
that extending the irrebuttable presumptions approach of Stanley, Vlandis,
and LaFleur to cases of the Salfi variety "would turn the doctrine of those
cases into a virtual engine of destruction for countless legislative judgments
which have heretofore been thought wholly consistent with the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution." 8 3 In Salfi and other cases for
which a lenient equal protection standard was appropriate, only a rational
basis was required of legislative presumptions lacking universal validity:
Under those standards, the question raised is not whether a statutory
provision precisely filters out those, and only those, who are in the
factual position which generated the congressional concern reflected in
the statute. Such a rule would ban all prophylactic provisions ...
Nor is the question whether thp provision filters out a substantial part
of the class which caused congressional concern, or whether it filters
out more members of the class than nonmembers. The question is
whether Congress, its concern having been reasonably aroused by the
possibility of an abuse which it legitimately desired to avoid, could
rationally have concluded both that a particular limitation or qualifica81. 422 U.S. at 772.
82. Id.

83. Id.
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tion would protect against its occurrence, and that the expense and
other difficulties of individual determinations
justified the inherent
4
imprecision of a prophylactic rule.8
In a dissent joined by Justice Marshall, Justice Brennan attacked the
Court's efforts to distinguish Vlandis and also concluded that the regulation
at issue was even more irrational than other welfare provisions recently set
aside by the Court's decisions. 8 5 The regulation invalidated in Vlandis,
Justice Brennan asserted, did not simply "set 'residency,' undefined, as the
criteria [sic] of eligibility ' 8 6 and then deny students the opportunity to
prove their status as in-state students. Instead, "it defined residency in
certain ways [and its] definitions of 'resident' were precisely parallel to the
statute [in Salfi], which defines 'widow' and 'child' in part by the number
of months of marriage. "87
Justice Brennan's observations are well taken. In Vlandis, students
were irrebuttably presumed to retain the same residency throughout their
careers in Connecticut institutions of higher learning; in Salfi, certain
marriages of brief duration were irrebuttably presumed to be sham arrangements. It may be, therefore, that the Court now wishes to restrict application
of a strict irrebuttable presumptions approach largely to those classifications
which affect recognized constitutional rights, but does not, given the case's
recent vintage, wish to overrule Vlandis outright.
II.

JUSTICE MARSHALL ON EQUAL PROTECTION

Of the recent doctrinal innovations by the Burger Court which affect
the constitutional status of interests not given specific mention in the
Constitution, the Court's restrictions on the scope of modern equal protection analysis have received the most systematic criticism, principally from
Justice Marshall. Justice Marshall's differences with the majority have
focused chiefly on the tendency of the two-tiered approach to ossify equal
protection analysis. He first articulated a flexible alternative to that technique in Dandridge v. Williams,88 the 1970 case in which a majority,
speaking through Justice Stewart, upheld a state-imposed family ceiling of
roughly $250 per month on funds provided under the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) program. Justice Stewart recognized that
"[t]he administration of public welfare assistance . . . involves the most
basic economic needs of impoverished human beings," 89 but he rejected the
84. Id. at 777.
85. Id. at 802-03. Justice Brennan cited Murry and Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628
(1974) (statutory bar to disability benefits imposed upon illegitimate children of disabled insured
born after onset of disability).
86. 422 U.S. at 803.
87. Id. (emphasis in original).
88. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
89. Id. at 485.
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claim that there is a right to welfare benefits which would trigger strict
scrutiny of the AFDC ceiling and held that the regulation was rationally
related to the legitimate state objectives of encouraging employment and
maintaining an equitable balance between the incomes of welfare families
and those of the working poor.
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, agreed with the contention
of Justice Douglas in a separate dissent that the ceiling conflicted with
applicable federal regulations. 90 But his disagreement with the majority was
91
much more broadly based. Justice Marshall saw "some resemblance"
between the classification at issue in the case and the classification based on
illegitimacy which the Court had subjected to strict scrutiny and invalidated
in Levy v. Louisiana.92 He also expressed doubt whether "a person whose
very survival is at stake would be comforted by the knowledge that his
'fundamental' rights are preserved intact" ;93 asserted that less drastic means
were available for accomplishing the objectives ostensibly underlying the
ceiling; indicated his skepticism that the asserted objectives were the actual
purposes which the regulation was designed to serve; and concluded that, in
any event, the regulation was both grossly overinclusive and underinclusive.
More significantly for purposes of this analysis, Justice Marshall contended that "[t]his case simply defies easy characterization in terms of one
or the other of" the tests available under the two-tiered formula 94 and
asserted more broadly that "equal protection analysis of [the Dandridge]
case is not appreciably advanced by the a priori definition of a 'right,'
fundamental or otherwise." 95 Instead, he maintained, "concentration must
be placed upon the character of the classification in question, the relative
importance to individuals in the class discriminated against of the governreceive, and the asserted state interests in
mental benefits that they do not
96
support of the classification."
Justice Marshall modeled his approach on the language of Justice
Black's opinion for the Court in Williams v. Rhodes,97 the Wallace elector
case invalidating Ohio regulations which restricted party access to the
ballot. Justice Black had observed that the challenged regulations affected
90. Id. at 490-508 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 523.
92. 391 U.S. 68 (1968). In Levy, the Court struck down a state court interpretation of the
Louisiana wrongful death statute which denied a right of recovery to the illegitimate child of a
deceased mother. The Court found "invidious discrimination" violative of the fourteenth
amendment, concluding that "[1]egitimacy or illegitimacy of birth has no relation to the nature
of the wrong allegedly inflicted on the mother." Id. at 72.

93. 397 U.S. at 520 n.14.
94. Id.at 520.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 520-21.
97. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
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the "precious freedoms" 98 of association and suffrage and concluded that
"[t]he State has here failed to show any 'compelling interest' which justifies
imposing such heavy burdens on the right to vote and to associate." 99 He
prefaced his application of the compelling interest test, however, with a
more general statement of the Court's task in equal protection cases, observing: "In determining whether or not a state law violates the Equal Protection
Clause, we must consider the facts and circumstances behind the law, the
interests which the State claims to be protecting, and the interests of those
who are disadvantaged by the classification.'"°This flexible, balancing-ofinterests approach is the mode of analysis which Justice Marshall believes
the Court should follow in equal protection litigation.
Dissenting in Rodriguez, Justice Marshall advanced a variation of the
flexible approach which he had articulated in his Dandridge dissent. 10' He
challenged the Rodriguez majority's conclusion that strict scrutiny should
be invoked only when a challenged classification is based on a suspect
criterion or infringes upon rights expressed or implied in the Constitution.
The Court's conception of the fundamental rights branch of the "new"
equal protection made that aspect of the compelling interest doctrine meaningless, he maintained, since recognized constitutional rights already enjoy
protection under the provisions of the Constitution in which they are
grounded. As an alternative, Justice Marshall advocated adoption of a
sliding-scale approach: in certain cases, the degree of scrutiny given regulation of an activity or interest would depend on the significance of the activity
or interest to the enjoyment of recognized constitutional rights. Since education, the interest at issue in Rodriguez, was very closely related to the
enjoyment of first amendment and voting rights, said Marshall, an educational financing scheme that denies equal educational opportunities should
be given "far more than the lenient scrutiny . . . which the majority
02
pursues. ' 1
Justice Marshall's most recent statement was occasioned by the Court's
decision in MassachusettsBoard of Retirement v. Murgia. 10 3 The Murgia
Court summarily affirmed a statute making fifty the mandatory retirement
age for members of the uniformed branch of the state police. Rejecting the
claim that age is a suspect basis of classification or public employment a
fundamental constitutional right, the Court upheld the regulation as rationally related to the legitimate state interest in protecting the public by assuring
the physical fitness of its police.
98. Id. at 30.
99. Id. at 31.
100. Id. at 30 (footnote omitted).
101. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-110 (Marshall,.J.,
dissenting).
102. Id. at 110.
103. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
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Justice Marshall was the lone dissenter. 104 As in earlier opinions,105 he
contended that the majority was not actually following the rigid, two-tiered
formula in many cases. "The model's two fixed modes of analysis, strict
scrutiny and mere rationality," he wrote, "simply do not describe the
inquiry the Court has undertaken-or should undertake-in equal protection
cases. Rather, the inquiry has been much more sophisticated and the Court
should admit as much." 1 6 In Justice Marshall's view, the rigidity of the
articulated approach was its major weakness. Since legislation subjected to
strict scrutiny rarely, if ever, survived challenge, the Court was naturally
"hesitant to expand the number of categories of rights and classes subject to
strict scrutiny, when each expansion involves the invalidation of virtually
every classification bearing upon a newly covered category." 10 7 Yet application of the rationality test meant virtually no scrutiny at all of challenged
regulations. Thus, no meaningful protection was extended under the twotiered formula to "rights, not now classified as 'fundamental,' that remain
vital to the flourishing of a free society, and classes, not now classified as
'suspect,' that are unfairly burdened by invidious discrimination unrelated
to the individual worth of their members." 10 8 Justice Marshall praised the
Court's willingness in practice to apply more flexible standards, but added:
[T]here are problems with deciding cases based on factors not encompassed by the applicable standards. First, the approach is rudderless,
affording no notice to interested parties of the standards governing
particular cases and giving no firm guidance to judges who, as a
consequence, must assess the constitutionality of legislation before
them on an ad hoc basis. Second, and not unrelatedly, the approach is
unpredictable and requires holding this Court to standards it has never
publicly adopted. Thus the approach presents the danger that...
relevant factors will be misapplied or ignored. All interests not "fundamental" and all classes not "suspect" are not the same; and it is time
for the Court to drop the pretense that, for purposes of the Equal
Protection Clause, they are. 109
Justice Marshall's support for a more flexible equal protection standard than
that presently articulated by the Court does not mean, of course, that he
104.

Id. at 317. Justice Stevens did not participate in the Court's decision of the case.

105. See, e.g., Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417 (1974). In Marshallthe majority held
that a federal law excluding drug addicts with two or more prior felony convictions from a
program of rehabilitation did not constitute a denial of due process or equal protection. Justice

Marshall dissented, finding it "hard to understand why a statute which.

.

the opportunity even to be considered for treatment for his disease.

should be tested under

. .

deprives [a man] of

the same minimal standards of rationality that we apply to statutes regulating.
pharmacies." Id. at 432-33.
106. 427 U.S. at 318.
107. Id. at 319 (footnote omitted).
108. Id. at 320.
109. Id. at 321.

. . who

can own
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would discard entirely the compelling interest test in equal protection contexts. In Murgia, for example, he observed:
Some classifications are so invidious that they should be struck down
automatically absent the most compelling state interest, and by suggesting the limitations of strict scrutiny analysis I do not mean to imply
otherwise. The analysis should be accomplished, however, not by
stratified notions of "suspect" classes and "fundamental" rights, but
by individualized assessments of the particular classes and rights involved in each case. Of course, the traditional suspect classes and
fundamental rights would still rank at the top of the list of protected
categories, so that in cases involving those categories analysis would be
functionally equivalent to strict scrutiny. Thus, the advantages of the
approach I favor do not appear in such cases, but rather emerge in
those dealing with traditionally less protected classes and rights." 0
Im. FLEXIBLE EQUAL PROTECTION AS AN ALTERNATIVE
The sort of flexible formula which Justice Marshall supports as an
alternative to the two-tiered standard currently articulated by the Court in the
equal protection field could be effectively employed as the Court's sole
vehicle for protecting substantive rights and interests not given specific
protection in the Constitution. Under such an approach, (a) the fundamental
rights branch of the two-tiered equal protection standard would be dismantled; (b) statutes affecting rights specifically recognized in the Constitution
would be evaluated under the constitutional provision in which the right is
guaranteed rather than under equal protection standards; and (c) discriminatory legislation affecting interests not presently accorded protection under
some other constitutional provision could be evaluated under the equal
protection guarantee through a balancing of competing societal and individual interests. II Such an approach would, at minimum, alleviate the present
doctrinal confusion. More significantly, it would relieve the Court of pressure to designate certain interests as "rights," assign those "rights" a
constitutional status, and then attempt to explain why certain interests are
110. Id.at3l9n.1.
111. As a logical corollary to this approach, the suspect categories branch of the compelling
interest doctrine should perhaps be limited to the sort of racial classifications against which the
equal protection clause was historically directed. The validity of other classifications could be
determined on a case-by-case basis through the application of a balancing process. After all,
when a court labels a classification "suspect" it is simply stating a conclusion that it is highly
unlikely that such a classification could serve any legitimate and substantial governmental
interest. The opinions in at least one recent case evidence an awareness of this deficiency in
equal protection jurisprudence. See Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451, 463-64 (Powell, J., concurring), id. at 464-66 (Stevens, J., concurring).
It should be noted that a number of recent studies have advocated adoption of a flexible
equal protection standard as a supplement to existing doctrine in certain types of cases. See,
e.g., Coven & Fersh, supra note 14; Craven, Personhood: The Right to Be Let Alone, 1976
DUKE L.J. 699.
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within the scope of the Constitution and others are not, and why certain
"rights" within the document's "implied" scope enjoy a more privileged
status-irrespective of the circumstances in which they are asserted-than
others which the Constitution is also said to protect.
In a sense, a flexible equal protection standard would not possess the
clarity of the two-tiered approach in which the critical question is simply
whether a regulation will be subjected to strict scrutiny-and almost certainly be struck down-or merely to the requirements of rationality-and almost
certainly be upheld. As cases were decided, however, the mode of analysis
employed by the Court in weighing the competing interests at issue would
probably become increasingly well-defined. Moreover, while under such an
approach the Court could never entirely escape the charge that it was acting
as a super-legislature ruling on the wisdom of challenged legislation, it
would at least not be arrogating to itself the authority to graft new rights onto
the Constitution-rights which would be controlling and perhaps extended
in reach in future cases and which, if labeled "fundamental," might be
insulated from all governmental interference.
A flexible conception of substantive due proocess could serve essentially the same purpose as a flexible equal protection standard, of course,
and reliance on due process would enable the Court to avoid the difficulties
sometimes encountered in attempting to place certain categories of cases
into an equal protection mold. There are a number of reasons, however, why
resort to a flexible due process standard would be unsatisfactory-why, in
fact, the doctrine of substantive due process should be discarded entirely.
In the first place, the force of precedent is clearly against its use. The
Court appears to have abandoned substantive due process entirely in
economic cases, except perhaps in the most abstract sense. 112 Indeed, the
anti-substantive due process tone of Justice Black's opinion for the Court in
one such modem case, Ferguson v. Skrupa,113 was so strong that Justice
Harlan felt compelled to append a brief statement implying that he, at least,
would still require that economic regulations have some "rational relation to
a constitutionally permissible objective." 114 Justice Stewart was probably
correct when he asserted in a brief concurrence filed in Roe v. Wade'1 5 that
112. Indicative of the Court's current attitude toward economic due process is North

Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156, 164-67 (1973),
upholding a state statute requiring that drug stores be owned or controlled by practicing

pharmacists. See also Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel.
Western Reference & Bond Ass'n, Inc., 313 U.S. 236 (1941); United States v. Carolene Prod.
Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). See generally
McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial,
1962 Sup. CT. REv.34, 36-40.

113 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
114. Id. at 733 (Harlan, J.,concurring).
115. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Stewart, J.,concurring).
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the modern Court, Skrupa to the contrary, had never abandoned substantive
due process completely. 116 But he was extremely hard-pressed to cite examples of modern cases bearing on the notion that "the 'liberty' protected by
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment covers more than those
freedoms explicitly named in the Bill of Rights." 117 Of the cases he cited in
support of the survival of nonprocedural due process, three pre-dated the
1937 revolution in the Court's conception of substantive due process; 18 two
recognized a right to international travel,1 9 but both of these cases could be
conceptualized constitutionally as first amendment cases, and the decision
in one of them 120 rested on statutory grounds; two others involved a right of
interstate travel not grounded in the due process guarantee; 121 one was a
voting case which employed the rhetoric of the fundamental rights branch of
modern equal protection analysis; 122 one involved racial discrimination and
123
the equal protection element in the fifth amendment's due process clause;
and another 124 might be viewed as a free association case.125
Moreover, even though a form of substantive due process apparently
did survive the 1937 revolution, the standard applied in economic cases is
the extremely lenient one of rationality. And it seemed clear, until the 1973
abortion decisions' 26 at least, that the same lenient scrutiny would be given
regulations affecting non-economic freedom. In a concurring opinion registered in Shapiro v. Thompson,127 for example, Justice Stewart contrasted
the constitutional status of the right of interstate travel at issue there with the
right of international travel recognized in Kent v. Dulles128 and Aptheker v.
Secretary of State. 2 9 The right to interstate travel, he asserted, was a
fundamental right of citizenship which could be regulated only on a showing
of compelling governmental interest. As such, it was to be distinguished
from the right to foreign travel, which Justice Stewart implicitly characterized as "a mere conditional liberty subject to regulation and control under
30
conventional [read lenient] due process or equal protection standards." 1
116. Id. at 167-68.
117. Id. at 168.

118. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
119. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116

(1958).
120. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958).

121.

Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
Cf. id. at 24748.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
394 U.S. 618, 642 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring).
357 U.S. 116 (1958).

129. 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
130.

394 U.S. at 643 n.1.
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The present Court is apparently pursuing a rigid, two-tiered approach
to substantive due process in which certain activities are characterized as
fundamental rights and their regulation subjected to strict scrutiny while
others (e.g., the freedom of personal appearance "assumed" to exist in
Kelley v. Johnson)13 I are accorded meager status. This approach, too,
would appear to have little support in precedent. It is true that modern
fourteenth amendment "incorporation" cases 32 and those defining the
scope of due process as embodying a general requirement of "fair" proceedings' 33 have employed fundamental rights rhetoric. And while the
implication of such cases would appear to be that only fundamental rights
are to be given any degree of due process protection, there is some semblance of precedential support for the present Court's dual substantive due
process approach in the combination of the rhetoric of these cases and that of
' 134
early economic cases giving a special emphasis to "liberty of contract
with the rhetoric of modern cases subjecting economic regulations to lenient
scrutiny under substantive due process. Even so, the process is a strained
one. Moreover, a rigid, two-tiered approach to substantive due process
suffers from the same problems which Justice Marshall has seen in the
application of such a formula in equal protection litigation.
Avoidance of doctrinal overload is another reason for rejecting further
reliance on substantive due process. In the incorporation cases, the fourteenth amendment due process clause has served as a sort of constitutional
shorthand for most Bill of Rights guarantees-even though the Bill of
Rights itself includes a virtually identical clause, and the language of the due
process clause seems ill-suited for this function in light of the generally
accepted notion of modern cases that incorporated rights will have the same
status under the fourteenth amendment that they enjoy under the first
eight.' 35 Due process is also a general guarantee of "fundamentally fair"
131.

425 U.S. 238, 244 (1976).

132. The "incorporation" doctrine posits that certain of the limitations on federal power
embodied in the Bill of Rights are incorporated in, and made applicable to the states by, the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Notable incorporation cases include Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (states subject to prohibition on former jeopardy); Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (states subject to sixth amendment jury trial provisions);
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (right of accused to compulsory process for securing
witnesses in his defense); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (speedy trial provi-

sions); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (defendant's right to cross-examine witnesses);
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (privilege against self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wain-

wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to assistance of counsel). See generally Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 323-28 (1937).
133. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (due process requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt in juvenile action analogous to adult criminal proceeding).
134. E.g., Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 545 (1923); Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905).
135. But see Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356
(1972) (upholding against sixth amendment, due process and equal protection claims Oregon

and Louisiana laws which permitted criminal conviction by less-than-unanimous jury).
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proceedings in criminal cases, 136 has been employed to require notice and
some sort of hearing in certain civil cases, 137 and was the vehicle for recent
Court attacks on irrebuttable legal presumptions. 13 The addition of substantive due process to the list of functions which the guarantee is used to
perform arguably may be said unduly to clutter modern doctrinal lines in the
due process field.
The Court has never assigned the equal protection clause the wide
variety of functions given the due process guarantee, and adoption of a
flexible equal protection formula obviously would not substantially increase-indeed, would probably help to reduce-the likelihood of doctrinal
overload in the equal protection field. Adoption of such an approach would
also require little if any modification of precedent. While substantive due
process has been largely dormant in the Supreme Court for the past forty
years, the equal protection guarantee-'"the usual last restort of constitutional arguments" 1 39 in an earlier era-has flourished. Furthermore, there
would appear to be as much precedential support for a flexible formula as
there is for the rigid, two-tiered standard which the Burger Court now
purports to embrace. Beginning with Skinner v. Oklahoma 140 and Korematsu v. United States, modem equal protection cases have held that certain
discriminatory regulations are to be accorded stricter scrutiny than others; it
was not until the latter years of the Warren era, however, that the Court's
opinions began to suggest that there was only one degree of strict scrutinythe rigorous, compelling interest standard. Moreover, even certain of the
later Warren era opinions invoking the compelling interest test suggested
that the degree of stricter-than-traditional scrutiny to be given a challenged
regulation would vary with "the facts and circumstances behind the law, the
interests which the State claims to be protecting, and the interests of those
who are disadvantaged by the classification."' 4 2
The Burger Court's purported rejection of a flexible formula and its
restriction of the compelling interest test's fundamental rights branch to
recognized rights grounded in some constitutional provision other than the
equal protection guarantee render the test itself superfluous. Beyond this,
the Court's position would appear to have little support in precedent. The
136. E.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
137.

E.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).

138. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
139.

Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).

140. 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (Oklahoma statute providing for the sterilization of "habitual
criminals").
141.

323 U.S. 214 (1944) (order promulgated by the Commanding General of the Western

Defense command pursuant to an executive order, directing the exclusion of all persons of
Japanese ancestry from a described West Coast Military Area).
142. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968) (footnote omitted). See also Carrington v.
Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 93 (1965).
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fundamental rights branch of equal protection analysis had its genesis in
Justice Douglas' opinion for the Court in Skinner v. Oklahoma. 143 When
Justice Douglas spoke in Skinner of procreation as "one of the basic civil
rights of man,' 144 it is doubtful that he--or most of the members of the
Court for which he spoke-was asserting that the Constitution guaranteed
such a right apart from the equal protection context. After all, Skinner was
decided during the period of the Court's intense frontal assault on prior
Supreme Court judicial legislation in the economic field. Procreation can be
viewed as a recognized constitutional guarantee only if one considers it
implicit in the right of privacy, 145 and the Court did not incorporate the
privacy concept into the scope of recognized constitutional rights until
decades after the Skinner decision. 146 Likewise, certain other "fundamental
rights" recognized by the Warren Court can be conceptualized as having
some constitutional basis independent of equal protection only through
resort to the convenient vacuity of the privacy concept. 147 And certainly the
right to vote in state elections, which the Warren Court recognized in a
variety of equal protection contexts and characterized in a variety of
ways, 148 could only have been bottomed in the equal protection guarantee.
Finally, of course, strict scrutiny of state school segregation in Brown v.
Board of Education'49 and companion cases was triggered not by application of the concept of suspect categories, but by Chief Justice Warren's
conclusion for the Court that an opportunity to an education, "where the
state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to
all on equal terms" 15 0 -even though the Constitution clearly does not
guarantee any right to an equal education. The restrictive reading which the
Burger Court has given modem equal protection precedents in Rodriguez
and related cases, then, is profoundly unconvincing.
Any precedential problems to which adoption of a flexible formula
might give rise are further obviated by the Burger Court's own willingness
to follow a flexible approach in certain cases, while simultaneously giving
lip service to the rigid, two-tiered standard. At times, moreover, the Court
143. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
144. Id. at 541.

145. As did the Rodriguez majority, San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1, 34 n.76 (1973).
146. This was accomplished in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
147. See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68,71 (1968) (the right to an "intimate, familial"
relationship); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (the right to marry).
148. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
150. Id. at 493. Chief Justice Warren's opinion in Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954),
invalidating segregation in District of Columbia schools, did rely, of course, on suspect
categories rhetoric.
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has appeared to embrace openly a flexible conception of equal protection.
The Court's opinion in Bullock v. Carter,'5 ' invalidating Texas' scheme of
exorbitant candidate filing fees, is perhaps most illustrative. Chief Justice
Burger, a critic of the compelling interest test's inflexibility,1 52 spoke for the
Bullock Court. Burger conceded that the Court had "not heretofore attached
such fundamental status to candidacy as to invoke a rigorous standard of
review." He added, however, that the rights of voters and candidates could
not be neatly separated and that the Texas filing system had the effect of
limiting voter choice by restricting candidate access to the ballot. The mere
"existence of such barriers," he asserted, did "not of itself compel close
scrutiny." Instead, it was "essential to examine in a realistic light the extent
and nature of their impact on voters." 153 Since the filing system had "a real
and appreciable impact" and the impact was "related to the resources of the
voters," close scrutiny was necessary. This meant, the Chief Justice concluded, that the regulations must be "found reasonably necessary to the
54
accomplishment of legitimate state objectives." 1
Chief Justice Burger's line of reasoning in Bullock closely parallels the
approach which Justice Marshall has advanced, particularly the reasoning of
the latter's Rodriguez dissent. While leaving the precise standard of scrutiny
somewhat obscure, the Chief Justice clearly articulated a standard of review
for the Texas filing system which was both more rigorous than the traditional formula and less demanding than the requirements of the compelling
interest doctrine. Indeed, all that would appear to remain is for the Court
simply to acknowledge candidly its acceptance of a flexible approach,
clarify its position, and follow it consistently in equal protection litigation.
IV.

CONCLUSION

There are those on and off the Supreme Court, of course, who will
view the pliable nature of the flexible approach to equal protection as its
principal weakness. Those of one persuasion will complain that adoption of
a flexible formula may jeopardize interests (and classes) whose regulation is
now subject to the virtually insurmountable requirements of the compelling
interest test. Others will argue that the standard, like the substantive due
process standard of early economic cases, leaves no limit but the sky to the
interventionist tendencies of activist judges. The short answer to both
151. 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
152. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting),
where the Chief Justice observed that to review governmental classifications under the compelling interest standard "is to condemn them all. So far as I am aware, no state law has ever
satisfied this seemingly insurmountable standard, and I doubt one ever will, for it demands
nothing less than perfection."
153. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 142-43 (1972).
154. Id. at 144.
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groups is that the dangers they see in the Court's adoption of a flexible
conception of equal protection will always be present on the Court, regardless of its doctrinal inclinations. As certain Burger Court decisions indicate,
particular interests and classes can simply be removed from the categories
now accorded strict scrutiny protection. 155 By the same token, there would
appear to be no limit to the number of interests which can be characterized
as rights "implicit" in the Constitution's scope.
In rejecting rigorous scrutiny of the discriminatory welfare regulations
at issue in Dandridge v. Williams, 156 Justice Stewart observed that strict
review "of state economic or social regulation . . . would be far too
reminiscent of an era when the Court thought the Fourteenth Amendment
gave it power to strike down state laws 'because they may be unwise,
improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.' -157
With due respect, however, Justices on the modern Court, with the possibile
exception of Justice Black, have always been willing-albeit with varying
degrees of enthusiasm-to go beyond rights spelled out in the Constitution
in reviewing challenged legislation. 158 The members of the Burger Court are
no exception, as the 1973 abortion decisions make perfectly clear.
Beyond a point-however wavering and uncertain that point may
be-the legislative tendencies of Supreme Court Justices cannot be excused
as the natural consequence of the Court's obligation to interpret a vaguely
worded constitutional text. Rather, they are an affront to separation of
powers and the concept of a written constitution. Even so, such tendencies
would appear to be an inevitable ingredient of Supreme Court decisionmaking, whatever the Court's composition. The ultimate question, then, is not
155. Compare, for example, the Burger Court opinions in Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495

(1976), and San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), with those of the
Warren Court in Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968), and Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954).
156. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
157. Id. at 484.

158. Justice Black opposed use of equal protection as "a handy instrument to strike down
state laws which the Court feels are based on bad governmental policy," Harper v. Virginia Bd.

of Elections, 383 U:S. 663, 673 (1966) (dissenting), and once said even of the lenient, rational
basis standard of equal protection: "I regret to become involved at all in this formula useful

only to invalidate state laws objectionable to the Court." Handwritten note on file in the Frank
Murphy Papers, Michigan Historical Collection, University of Michigan. He also doubted
whether the equal protection guarantee should ever have been given any semantic meaning or

extended in reach beyond racial classifications. Interview with Hugo L. Black, Washington,
D.C., July 6, 1971. In selected issue areas, however, he joined the Court's modern extensions

of equal protection doctrine, and seemed to ascribe to the guarantee a more flexible meaning
than he attached to other constitutional guarantees. Yarbrough, Justices Black and Douglas:
The JudicialFunction and the Scope of ConstitutionalLiberties, 1973 DUKE L.J. 441,472-83.

Asked for his definition of an "invidious" discrimination, he would reply with a smile, "I don't
know, no one knows," but would add that, in the final analysis, "we must make a judgment on
the basis of [each] case." Interview with Hugo L. Black, supra.
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whether the Court should assume the role of "super-legislature," but how it
should proceed in exercising that function. 159 Under its articulated approach
in both the equal protection and due process fields, the Court now effectively excludes certain interests from any protection and protects others from
virtually all control, whatever the gravity of the state's interference with the
interests at issue, whatever the weight of state justifications. Under a
flexible approach, the Court could refuse to label certain activities "rights"
and instead assign them an intermediate constitutional status. It could thus
avoid locking itself further into the all-or-nothing scrutiny implicit in the
two-tiered formula-a position from which it can extricate itself in specific
instances only by obscuring the doctrinal basis of its decisions. Instead, the
Court would examine on its own merits each challenged regulation and the
interests asserted for and against its continued enforcement. Which of these
courses the Court should pursue would appear obvious.
159. The debate over whether the Court should engage in "judicial legislation" still rages, of
course. For recent treatments of the issue, see L. LUSKY. By WHAT RIGHT? (1975); Ely, The
Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973); Grey, Do We

Have an Unwritten Constitution?,27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975); Linde, Judges, Critics, and the
Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227 (1972). See also Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 TermForeword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1

(1973). For a defense (perhaps tongue-in-cheek) of the provocative notion that the fourteenth
amendment's privileges and immunities guarantee could be activated as the basis for judicially
created rights, see Kurland, The Privileges or Immunities Clause: 'Its Hour Come Round at
Last'?, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 405.

